摘要
实际参与生产经营和公司管理的创业板上市公司高级管理人员(高管)集体离职不仅对创业板公司的长期稳定发展造成不利的影响,同时也给创业板市场带来负面冲击,并加大创业板市场波动。本文从微观视角验证了PE基金抑制高管集体离职的积极作用,实证结果表明:首先,相比于没有PE基金参与的创业板上市公司,PE基金的参与能够显著的抑制高管主动离职;其次,从PE基金管理合伙人的股东背景视角看,相比于国资基金和民营基金,外资基金抑制高管离职的作用最为显著;而券商直投基金对抑制高管离职的作用不强。
The resignation of the top management executives who are actually conducting the production operation and company management will cause adverse effects both on long-term stable development of the companies themselves, and on the Growth Enterprise Market （GEM）＇s development. From the microscopic perspective, the empirical results of this paper show that： （1） compared to the GEM listing companies without PE involvement, PE funds＇ participation can restrain executives voluntary resignations; （2） from the perspective of the shareholder background of the PE funds, foreign funds, compared to state owned funds and non-state owned funds can inhibit the executive resignation more significantly, but the inhibition of the brokerage directed funds on executive resignation is not strong.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第9期25-34,70,共11页
Securities Market Herald
基金
广东省科学技术厅软科学研究项目"广东科技型创业企业技术商业化能力与风险投资发展关系研究"(2012B070300022)
广州市科技与信息化局2013软科学研究计划项目"如何提高广州市中小微型科技企业技术商品化能力研究"(2013Y4300012)
关键词
私募股权基金
高管主动离职
PE类型
private equity fund, top management executive voluntary resignation, private equity style
