期刊文献+

中国邮政业征收“份子钱”合意性及其规制治理

Research on Desirability of Levying "Common Charges" and Regulatory Governance in China's Postal Industry
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摘要 对于是否应该向快递企业征收"份子钱"作为普遍服务基金,已成为近年来中国邮政业热议的话题。本文依据安东等建立的基本模型^([1]),并基于中国特有的制度禀赋条件,从正当性、公平性以及有效性三个方面,详细探讨了"份子钱"征收的合意性。文章发现,基于中国邮政业背景,"份子钱"融资方式具有一定的合意性,但同时又会带来新的问题与矛盾。为了改善"份子钱"融资的实施效果,文章对进一步调整中国邮政业规制治理体系提出了相应的政策建议。 In recent years,it has become a hot topic in China’s postal industry that whether should levy“common charges”on express enterprises as the universal service fund.Based on Anton’s model and the conditions of institution endowment in China,the desirability of levying“common charges”on express enterprises has discussed from three aspects:legitimacy,fairness and effectiveness.The article shows that“common charges”financing mode in China’s postal industry has certain desirable,but also brings new problems and contradictions.In order to improve the implementation effects of the financing mode,China’s postal industry regulatory system has to be changed.
作者 陈剑 夏大慰
出处 《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第10期92-98,共7页 Research on Economics and Management
基金 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"亲贫视角下中国公用事业改革与规制模式的最优设计研究"(10YJC790022)
关键词 邮政业 普遍服务基金 份子钱 规制治理 Postal Industry Universal Service Fund Common Charges Regulatory Governance
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参考文献19

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