摘要
民族主义运动往往在获得大众支持后,才开始对一国政治或外交政策产生重大影响。然而,针对民族主义运动的研究却经常将研究重点放在政治精英身上,而非大众参与者。回答的问题多是:精英为何发动民族主义运动?一个较少被触及的问题是:在什么情况下,大众会选择参与国家领导下的民族主义运动?对此,作者提出一个基于大众的、理性主义的解释,认为国家领导下的民族主义运动旨在鼓励公民做出自我牺牲,从而增加国家控制下的人力、物力资源。面对政治精英的号召,个人依据自身的物质利益做出选择。当个人认为自己是国内制度的受益者时,其响应国家号召、忍受短期经济困难的意愿加强。在宏观层面上,当国内制度是有利于大多数人的"包容性制度"时,国家领导的民族主义动员更容易取得成功。相反,当国内制度是有利于少数人的"排他性制度"时,国家领导的民族主义动员将面临更大阻力。作者通过对比第一次世界大战期间英国与德国两国政府开展的民族主义动员,对这一理论设想进行论证。
A nationalist movement exerts a grave impact on the politics or foreign policy of a country when it acquires a mass following.Nevertheless,students of nationalist movements have focused on political elites as if they were the only significant agents.Relatively,few attempts have been made to explain why the mass respond to the mobilization led by political elites.This article proposes a mass-based,instrumentalist explanation for state-led nationalist mobilization.It argues that the goal of nationalist mobilization is to encourage self-sacrifice by citizens and increase human and material resources under state control.For individuals,their nationalist behavior is motivated by self-regarding material interests.They are more willing to endure temporary hardship and respond to mobilization led by the state when domestic institutions favor their interests.At the aggregate level,state-led nationalist mobilization is more likely to succeed when domestic institutions are inclusive.In contrast,exclusive institutions inhibit state-led nationalist mobilization.To illustrate this argument,this article compares nationalist mobilization carried out in Britain and Germany during the First World War.
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第10期136-153,160,共18页
World Economics and Politics
关键词
民族主义动员
大众工具论
制度激励
包容性制度
排他性制度
nationalist mobilization
mass instrumentalism
institutional incentives
inclusive institutions
exclusive institutions