基于博弈分析的区域环境合作及收益分配研究

Study on Interests Allocation in Regional Environmental Cooperation Based on Game Theory

污染的区域性特征要求地区之间开展环境合作,不同地区在区域环境合作中的收益存在差异,需要基于公平考量进行区域环境合作收益的地区分配设计。本文以双主体的博弈分析为基础,分析具有不同属性的两个地区在环境合作与非合作情形下的效用变动。研究发现,区域环境合作可以增加区域整体的收益;但是,对于具体区域而言,存在地区间环境合作共赢的临界值。当两个地区的属性差异小于临界值时,区域环境合作才可实现两地区收益的同时提升;而当两个地区的差异超过临界值时,其中一个地区的收益在区域环境合作中反而会降低。针对区域环境合作存在的地区主体收益受损的情形,讨论了在损失补偿基础上进行合作剩余分配的收益分配思路,并进行了不同补偿原则的数值分析;最后,建议加大对参与合作主体受损的补偿力度。

Regional environmental cooperation helps to increase regional revenue in the whole economy-environment system. However, areas in regional environmental cooperation will gain （or loss） differently, which may impede cooperation. Therefore, the reallocation of regional environmental cooperation profits is necessary to be discussed. According to a double area game analysis, the profit difference between regional environmental cooperation and non-cooperation is analyzed. The result shows that cooperation will increase regional overall profit, but there is a critical value for a win-win situation. When the property difference between two areas is less than the critical value, the profits of the two areas will both increase ; but when the difference is larger than the critical value, the profit will reduce in one area while increase more in the other area. Focusing on the latter situation, loss compensation and cooperation interests allocation are studied. The distribution are based on principles of economic scale, environment preference and pollution transmission, and a numerical analysis is conducted accordingly.