地方政府环境规制及其波动机理研究——基于最优契约设计视角

Analysis on the Local Government Environmental Regulation and Its Fluctuation Mechanism:Based on the Perspective of Optimal Contract Design

文章基于最优契约设计视角,剖析了地方政府的最优环境规制及其波动,并讨论了当地居民作为第三方引入的作用。首先,利用委托代理模型构建了以地方政府效益最大化为目标并满足地方政府和企业激励约束条件的最优环境规制契约,该契约表明当保持地方政府高环境规制水平时,地方政府和企业处于同等地位,根据各自的收益分配来决定责任分担的比例,并与二者各自获得的中央政府的奖励比例一致,同时地方政府对企业的生产活动和环境保护活动都不进行经济激励。其次,讨论了重大环境污染事故发生后,地方政府环境规制在中央政府强力介入、环境污染事故影响减弱和影响完全消失三个典型时期的周期循环波动及其机理,结果表明当重大环境污染事故发生时,由于中央政府的强力介入,地方政府选择高水平的环境规制,这时企业生产努力水平和产量都较低,但发生环境污染事故的概率也最低;当环境污染事故影响减弱时,地方政府即使无法获得额外收益,也会通过相对降低环境规制水平来增加企业产量,环境污染事故发生的概率随之增加;当环境污染事故影响完全消失后,地方政府为获得额外收益和完成中央政府的经济考核,会选择低水平环境规制,企业的产量达到最大,环境污染事故发生的概率也最大,直至环境污染事故再次发生,进入下一轮的环境规制波动周期循环。再次,将当地居民作为第三方规制引入地方政府环境规制中,得到包含第三方监管的最优环境规制契约,最优契约的关键就是地方政府要确定在重大环境污染事故发生后对当地居民的收买成本,第三方规制的引入能够在一定程度上烫平地方政府环境规制的波动。最后,从解除地方环境规制部门与地方政府的隶属关系以保持地方政府环境规制部门独立性、推进产权制度改革以保持企业独立性和建立包含当地居民或者社会团体的第三方环境监管组织三个方面提出减小中国地方政府环境规制波动、实现地方政府环境规制最优契约的政策建议。

This paper analyzes the fluctuation mechanism of local government environmental regulation from the perspective of optimal contract design, and analyzes the influence of introducing local residents as the third party. First of all, we build the optimal environmental regulation contract which aims at the biggest to the local government efficiency and meets the enterprise incentive constraints by using the principal-agent model, and the analysis shows that when the local government keeps a high level of environmental regulation, the local governments and the enterprises are in the same position, according to the distribution of income to determine the responsibility of the respective proportion, and it is consistent with the ratio of awards obtained from the central government, and there is not any economic incentive to production activities or environmental protection activities between the local government and the enterprise. Secondly, we analyze the cycle fluctuation and its mechanism of environmental regulation in the three typical periods in terms of central government intervention after the serious environmental pollution accident, pollution accident being weakened and completely disappeared, and conclude that when the central government conducts strong involvement after the serious environmental pollution accident, the local government has to choose a high level of environmental regulation, then the enterprise production effort level and production are low, but the possibility of the occurrence of the serious environmental pollution accident is minimum, when the influence of the serious environmental pollution accident is weakening, the local government will choose the relatively low environmental regulation level even unable to get extra income, and the enterprise production increased, the probability of the occurrence of environmental pollution accidents also increases to a certain extent, when the impact of the serious environmental pollution accident completely disappears, the local government will choose the low level of environmental regulation to get extra income and to complete the economic assessment indicators of the central government, but the probability of the occurrence of the serious environmental pollution accident has increased; in the event of a new serious environmental pollution accident, the local government environmental regulation enters into the next round of cycle. Again, introducing local residents as the third party to collusion model between local government and enterprises, we obtain the optimal environmental regulation contract including third party supervision. The result shows that the key to the new contract is that the local government determines the cost to bribing the local residents after the occurrence of the serious environmental pollution accident, and introducing local residents can alleviate fluctuation of the local government environmental regulation. Finally, the paper proposes policy suggestions to reduce the local government environmental regulation fluctuation and realizing the optimal environmental regulation contract from three aspects such as ending the subordinate relations between local environmental regulation department and local administrative department to keep the environmental regulation departments independent, promoting the reform of property rights system to keep the enterprise independent and setting up the third party supervision organization which includes the local residents and social groups.