管理者任期、晋升激励与研发投资研究

Research on Management Tenure,Promotion Incentive and R&D Investment

本文在委托代理理论的分析框架下,着重运用高层梯队理论和心理契约理论,以我国2008—2012年上市公司为样本,考察了在晋升激励的作用下,管理者的既有任期和预期任期对研发投资的影响。结果发现:管理者既有任期与研发投资呈倒U型关系;管理者预期任期与研发投资正相关;晋升激励在既有任期影响研发投资中起到了正向调节作用,但在非国有公司中强于国有公司;晋升激励在预期任期影响研发投资中尚未起到调节作用,但在非国有公司中却起到了负向调节作用。这些研究结论对于深入理解企业的研发投资行为,以及完善管理者晋升激励机制和加强人力资源管理都具有一定的启示意义。

This paper investigates influence of actual and expected tenure of managers to R&D investment,using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2012. These results demonstrate that the relationship between actual tenure of managers and R&D investment takes on an inverted-U shape,the relationship between expected tenure of managers and R&D investment takes on positive correlation,promotion incentive plays the function of positive adjustment in the process of actual tenure influencing R&D investment,and this function is stronger in non-state-owned companies than that in state-owned ones,promotion incentive does not play regulating effect in the process of expected tenure influencing R&D investment,however,it plays the role of negative adjustment in those non-state-owned companies.