摘要
以一个风险中性的制造商和一个具有风险规避特性的销售商及2个具有竞争特性的第三方回收商组成的再制造闭环供应链系统为背景,构建了Downside-Risk测度的双第三方回收再制造闭环供应链决策模型,分析了销售商风险规避特性、第三方回收商之间的竞争关系对供应链的影响,证明了在风险共享和费用共享组合契约的控制下,Downside-Risk测度的双第三方回收再制造闭环供应链能够实现完美协调;最后,通过数值仿真研究和灵敏度分析,验证了该模型的有效性及实用性。
In the context of a risk-neutral supplier, a downside-risk retailer and two third-party logistics suppliers, a downside-risk closed loop supply chain model is established by using game theory, and the impact of revenue-and-expense sharing contract is analyzed in the channel, which shows that the contract may not coordinate such a channel on the theory of downside-risk control. Also, a risksharing contract which is composed of revenue-and-expense contract and return policy is designed that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides more profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination. Moreover, a case is given for justifying the effectiveness and feasibility of the risk-sharing contract.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第10期1520-1527,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2013GM001)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(12YJAZH114、13YJAZH12)
山东省社会科学规划研究资助项目(11CGLZ07、12CGLZ10)
山东理工大学人文社会科学发展基金资助项目(2010ZDXM07)
山东理工大学博士科研启动经费资助项目(2011KQ08)
关键词
风险规避
闭环供应链
古诺竞争
契约协调
downside-risk
closed-loop supply chain
Cournot competition
contract coordination