摘要
随着我国股权激励制度的建立和逐步完善,如何合理制定薪酬契约以激励高层管理者值得关注.以2006～2012年沪深A股国有上市公司为样本对薪酬结构和粘性的关系进行探讨,研究发现：虽然国有上市公司高管权益报酬已初具规模,但仍存在薪酬粘性现象,并且代表薪酬结构的股权激励强度与粘性存在区间效应,股权激励强度处在（0,0.45]时,粘性不存在,无股权激励或强度大于0.45时会产生粘性,同时验证了粘性对企业未来业绩有不利影响.基于上述结果,最后提出了相应的对策建议,以促进我国国有上市公司未来业绩提升.
With the establishment and development of Chinese stock incentive system, how to make reasonable compensation contracts deserves concentration. The paper takes A - share state - owned listed companies from 2006 to 2012 as the sample and investigate the relationship between compensation structure and stickiness. The result shows that compensation stickiness still exists even though equity -based awards has taken shape, and it suggests that there is a range effect between the intensity of equity incentive and stickiness. That is, if the intensity is within （0,0.45 ], stickiness does not exist. Conversely, it will engender stickiness. Meanwhile the stickiness proves to have a side effect on future performance. Based on the conclusions above, some suggestions are accordingly put forward to boost future performance.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第10期57-61,共5页
On Economic Problems
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(B14C00010)
关键词
公司治理
薪酬结构
薪酬粘性
股权激励强度
corporate governance
compensation structure
compensation stickiness
intensity of equity incentive
