国际碳排放交易的自我实施难题——一个合同执行的视角

Self-enforcing Dilemma in International Emission Trade System:Analytic framework for enacting a contract

作为一种市场化手段,国际碳排放交易制度被认为是应对气候变化最重要的政策工具,是国际气候制度的核心。然而,这种流行的观点也颇有争议。在国际社会缺乏强制第三方机制的条件下,国际碳排放交易的自我实施机制是维持协议存在的关键。从合同执行的角度看,以声誉为主的国际碳排放交易制度的自我实施要求信息有效传播、共同的规范以及对不合作的惩罚机制存在作为有效条件。研究发现,国际碳排放交易难以自我实施的原因在于:(1)碳排放价格、成本收益、以及减排技术信息的不确定性;(2)对碳排放责任及公正缺乏共识;(3)减排合作中搭便车行为的惩罚乏力;(4)资金和技术等质押机制的缺乏。上述结论的政策含义在于:(1)国际社会应增强全球碳排放的有效信息传播及相应的投资预期,逐步形成全球碳排放社会责任的共同认知;(2)发达国家应加大对碳排放的资金及技术的援助力度,从而激励发展中国家更多地参与国际碳排放体系。

The international carbon emissions trading system,as a kind of market-oriented means,is considered the most important policy tool to tackle climate change and is the core of the international climate regime. However,the view is con- troversial. The International Emission Trade System （IETS） must be self-enforcing since there is no supranational authority to ensure compliance. By using game-theory models,I try to provide a theoretic framework for enacting a contract to explain conditions for countries who have signed the IEAS. As a case study of Cap-and-Trade system,I hold that uncommon notion of carbon Emissions duties, uncertainty of information about carbon price or environmental costs and benefits （as well as learning about these costs and benefits） and the problem of free-riding,shortage of third party mechanics such as a global re- funding scheme （GRS） are key factors for the IETS as an self-enforcing international agreements. I advocate that the inter- national community should strengthen effective information dissemination of global carbon emissions and the corresponding investment expected and form gradually the common cognition of global carbon emissions of social responsibility; and that the developed countries should increase financial and technical assistance of carbon reduction in developing countries to stimu- late them to participate in the IETS.