山西票号顶身股机制再探析

New Analysis on Personal Share System in Piaohao(票号)of Shanxi Merchants(晋商)

顶身股是持有者基本薪酬与绩效工资的总括,无法流通、交易和继承,同时,在顶身股机制的评判中充满了人治化的色彩。顶身股持有者的总额可能超过财东持有的银股份额,但单个顶身股持有者的份额则在一厘至十三厘之间波动;出于自身利益考虑,身股持有者不愿财东持续增加银股的份额,由此在股份中出现了红利收益的正本与利息收入的副本区分。正副本之分及其收益的巨大差异,无疑在财东和经营者之间形成了一个双重的风险放大机制。在无限责任、缺乏必要监督和信用放款等条件下,顶身股机制中的双重风险放大机制最终成为摧垮票号群体的内在因素。顶身股机制尽管没有在现代企业制度中延续,但其建构中的有效成分则成为中国现代企业组织的嫁接基础,现代企业组织中的官利制则是它最为明显的体现。

Personal share includes share holder＇s basic salaries and performance-related pay, and cannot be circulated, transacted and inherited, and at the same time, the evaluation of personal share system is full of the color of man-rule. Personal share holders may hold more than shareholder＇s silver shares in total amount, while one single personal share holder is in 1 li （ 厘） to 13 li （ 厘 ） between fluctuations. For their own inter- est, personal holders are reluctance to sustained increase in silver shares, so the shares appears different be- tween dividend yield original （ 正本 ） and interest income copy （副本）. Undoubtedly, the profit gap be- tween the two interest styles results in such a fact the relations between the shareholders and the managers forms a double risk amplification mechanism. Under the condition of unlimited liability, no necessary supervi- sion and credit loans, the double risk amplification mechanism of personal shares eventually destroys Piaohao groups. Although the personal share system doesn＇t continue in the modem enterprise system, the effective components become the modem featured by ＂Guanli＂ system in enterprise organization grafting modem enterprise organization. basis of China banks, which is most evidently