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物理主义:来自必然二元论的挑战

Challenges of Necessitation Dualism to Physicalism
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摘要 必然二元论(ND)对必然版本的物理主义(NP)提出了新的挑战:它表明NP对规定物理主义是不充分的(几种主要的回应策略并不成功);而NP为了回应ND的挑战,需要接受斯图加对必然性版本的修正;但是要将斯图加的"不是形而上学的同一"贯彻到底,又面临着如何将修正的NP与非还原物理主义、还原物理主义(如取消论或同一论)相区别的问题。 Necessitation dualism(ND) poses new challenges to Necessitation Physicalism(NP):It claims that NP is inadequate for defining physicalism and its several major responses are not successful,either.To respond to the challenge of the advocators of ND,the advocators of NP must accept Stoljar's revision of the Necessitaion version.However,if they are going to carry through Stoljar's assertion that physical and mental properties are 'not metaphysically distinct',then they face the problem of how to discriminate the revised version of NP from non-reductive physicalism,and such reductive physicalism as Eliminativism and identity theory.
作者 刘玲
出处 《自然辩证法通讯》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期8-13,125,共6页 Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(14CZX015) 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(13YJC720025) 2012年华南师范大学青年教师科研培育基金项目(670266)
关键词 必然二元论(ND) 必然版本的物理主义(NP) 非还原物理主义 Necessitation dualism(ND) Necessitation physicalism(NP) Non-reductive physicalism
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