网络信息质量感知的信号博弈分析

Analysis of the Signaling Game of Network Information Quality Perception

文章将系统质量作为具有成本代价的传递信息质量水平的信号,运用信号博弈模型和完美贝叶斯均衡方法,分析了不同系统质量条件下的信息提供者和信息用户的行为策略,论证了系统质量作为有效传递信息质量信号的前提条件,及其对用户信息质量感知的影响作用,对信息市场的高效运行有重要的参考意义。

This paper describes system quality as a cost-price signal which can transmit the information quality level. The paper uses signaling game model and perfect Bayesian equilibrium method to analyze the behavior strategy of information providers and in- formation users under different conditions of system quality. The paper demonstrates the system quality as a prerequisite of the effec- tive transformation of information quality signal, as well as its impact on user information quality perception, which provides an im- portant reference for the high-efficiency operation of information market.