管理者过度自信与投资现金流敏感性

Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity——the Difference between SOE and Non-SOE

本文抛开理性人假设,从管理者过度自信的角度出发,基于2002-2013年间中国上市公司的数据,研究管理者过度自信对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响。研究发现,管理者过度自信能显著正向影响企业投资现金流敏感性;融资约束高的公司,其管理者过度自信对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响更加显著;代理问题严重的公司,其管理者过度自信对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响更加显著;在不同所有制下,管理者过度自信对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响程度也不同,国有企业管理者过度自信对企业投资现金流敏感性的影响更加显著,代理问题不同是其差异的主要原因。

This paper,setting aside the hypothesis of rational man,from the perspective of managerial overconfidence,researches managerial overconfidence influence on enterprises investment cash flow sensitivity,based on the data of Chinese listed companies between 2002 and 2013. The study finds that managerial overconfidence has significantly positive influence on enterprises investment cash flow sensitivity. Facing higher financing constraints,managerial overconfidence will affect enterprises investment cash flow sensitivity more significantly. Facing more serious agency problem,managerial overconfidence will affect enterprises investment cash flow sensitivity more significantly. Under different ownership,managerial overconfidence will affect enterprises investment cash flow sensitivity of different levels,the influence of state-owned enterprise managerial overconfidence on enterprises investment cash flow sensitivity is more significant,the influence of agency problem is a major cause of the differences.