不确定环境下的威权机制与经济发展

Authoritarian mechanisms and economic development under uncertain environment

在不确定的经济环境下,分别站在中央和地方政府的立场上,论文拓展在经济学领域日渐流行的实物期权模型方法而深入探讨了威权机制对经济发展的重要作用和意义.通过定义转移成本和威权租金这两个概念,论文揭示了威权机制加速经济发展的原理,并且解决了以前文献未能解决的关于政企合谋的激励问题:政府威权与微观经济主体是怎样结合的难题.特别的,针对中央和地方政府应用威权机制加速发展经济的动力不完全一致的情形,论文设计出了中央政府最优转移成本目标得以有效执行的最优契约机制,以确保实现中央政府社会福利最大化的目标.因此,当转移成本所造成的负面成本足够小时,论文揭示了威权机制在允许地方政府和企业合谋或合作的条件下,促使中国经济加速发展的关键作用,并且对于未来经济发展我们得出了具有指导意义的建设性建议.另外,论文的研究成果对于完善和丰富科学发展观也具有很好的借鉴意义.

This paper attempts to develop a real options-based approach to investigate the important implication of authoritarian mechanisms for economic development under uncertain environments, from the respective perspectives of central and local governments. By defining the concepts of transferrable costs and authoritarian rents, our model can shed new light on why authoritarian mechanisms can accelerate the economic growth, and provide new insights on the incentive problem of ＂collusion＂ or side contracts between local governments and enterprises. In order to maximize the social welfare, from the perspective of the central government we also allow for the optimal design of contract mechanisms between central and local governments. Our model results show that when the negative social costs caused by transferred costs are relatively little and if the ＂collusion＂ or side contracts between local governments and enterprises are allowed, authoritarian mechanisms can play important roles in accelerating economic growth and making macroeconomic policies should therefore take full account of the significant effect. Furthermore, our paper also provides constructive proposals concerning the future economic development in China's Mainland and facilitate improving the scientific conception of economic development in this country.