启蒙的第三要义:《判断力批判》中的启蒙思想(英文)

The Third Sense of Enlightenment as Seen in the Critique of the Power of Judgment

对现代启蒙批判思潮的反批判,康德哲学固然能够在基本原则和方法方面提供富有成效的支持,但这应是现代人所面临的任务和解决的问题。理性在今天依然占据首要的地位,但相比于启蒙时代人们对它的展望和憧憬,理性非但没有形成内在一致的统一体系,反而更趋多样化,呈现更多的内在矛盾。康德《判断力批判》诠证了理性诸多领域与不同原理之间关联的可能性和途径,揭明了启蒙的第三要义:理性不仅展现为不同的能力、原理和层面,而且这些领域及其现象可以分别予以探讨;不同的理性原理之间和不同领域之间的关联在理论上或是不清楚的,但它们在现象之中却确实地建立了起来;关于现象的表述原本可以分为不同层次,除了构造自然对象知识和人类行为法则的能力和形式,理性亦有构造情绪现象与审美现象的能力和形式。因此,理性批判并不限于通过对现有各种形式的知识的分析,揭示既有的理性形式及其构造活动,而且还在于发现理性的新形式和构造的可能性,从而揭示具有新的形式和性质的知识的可能性条件,直至这种知识本身。

A critique of the criticisms on modern enlightenment is a task confronting the modern people, for which Kantian philosophy can undoubtedly provide the basic principles and methodologies. Reason still holds a supreme position in today＇s world, but contrary to the expectations of those living in the age of Enlightenment, rather than forming a unitary and internally consistent system, reason seems more diversified and is beleaguered by more internal conflicts. Kant＇s Critique of the Power of Judgment explained whether and how the different fields of reason and their principles could be linked, thus throwing light on the third meaning of enlightenment： Reason manifests itself through different faculties, principles and on different levels, which can be examined separately; the links among different principles and territories may be vague in theory, but they are phenomenally recognized. Further, phenomena should be represented on different levels： Besides those involved in the construction of knowledge concerning natural objects and norms guiding human behavior, under reason should there be faculties and forms regarding emotion and taste. Therefore, any attempt to critique reason should not let itself be confined to just the revealing of the known forms of reason and their structures through an analysis of various existing knowledge, but should examine the possibility of other forms of reason and their structures with a view to finding the conditions for knowledge that exist in other forms and is of a different nature unto that knowledge itself.