基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链采购融资模式

Supply chain financing with purchase-order based on Stackelberg game

根据供应链采购融资的运作流程,建立并分析基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链融资模型.通过数值分析博弈均衡解发现,在供应商初始资金较小的情况下,供应链采购融资能够较大幅度地提高供应链绩效;融资产品的市场情况越好,即价格或挽回价值越高,供应链采购融资对于供应链的价值越大;向市场风险较小的供应商提供采购融资能够使银行获得较大的绩效提高;供应链采购融资是一种能够实现供应链成员双赢的供应链管理方法.

The operation process of supply chain purchase financing is analyzed. A Stackelberg game is used to model the financing decisions. Firstly, the game equilibrium is analyzed. Then the effect of supply chain purchases financing to the supply chain is considered. The results show that, when the initial budget of the supplier is relatively small, supply chain financing can greatly improve the supply chain performance. The higher the wholesale price and salvage value are, the more the value of the supply chain financing is. The bank can get more profits by supporting the supplier with purchaseorder financing in the low risk market scenarios. The results show that the supply chain purchase financing is a win-win mechanism.