市场结构、政府干预与手机芯片产业发展——基于博弈论视角

Market Structure,Government Intervention and Mobile Phone Chip Industry Development——Based on Game Theory Perspective

我国手机芯片产业发展相对落后,每年所需的手机芯片主要靠进口。在我国手机芯片市场上,高通公司是垄断者,占据了40%的市场份额。高通凭借垄断地位,采用捆绑销售商业模式和歧视性的差别专利授权政策,占有产业中的大部分利润,对我国手机芯片产业的发展造成严重损害。本文针对发改委对高通滥用市场优势地位调查事件,描述了手机芯片市场的竞争态势,建立了政府干预下的手机厂商联盟和高通之间的讨价还价模型。在求解过程中,首先对手机厂商联盟和高通讨价还价的金额进行了估算;然后根据手机厂商联盟、高通和发改委围绕原高通滥用优势地位所获得的利润的再分配,建立三方博弈模型,确定了发改委处罚高通的具体金额,最后推定了高通、手机厂商联盟和发改委三方的谈判底线并且对政府处理高通滥用市场优势地位提出了政策建议。

Mobile phone chip industry development in our country is relatively backward and mobile phone chips needed in our country each year mainly depend on import. Qualcomm occupies 60%market share in mobile phone chips market in our country, so it becomes a big monopoly. By virtue of monopoly position, Qualcomm Occupies most of the industry profits and does a great harm to the development of mobile phone chips industry in China by using the discriminatory patent licensing fees and bundling business model. In view of the event about the Development and Reform Commission （NDRC） investigation on Qualcomm abusing market dominant position, this paper describes the competitive situation of mobile phone chip market, and sets up the bargaining model between qualcomm and mobile phone manufacturer al iance under the government intervention. In the process of solving, first of al , we estimate the amount of bargaining between qualcomm and mobile phone manufacturer alliance;Then, we establish a tripartite game model on the redistribution of the profit gained by Qualcomm abusing dominant position among Qualcomm, phone association and NDRC. By solving the model we determine the sum of the specific fine which NDRC imposes on Qualcomm. Final y we presume the bottom line of negotiation of Qualcomm, mobile phone manufacturer alliance and NDRC and put forward some policy suggestion on government＆#39;s handling of qualcomm market dominant position abuse .