财政分权、地方官员与碳排放——来自中国省长、省委书记的证据

Fiscal Decentralization,Officials and Carbon Emission:Evidence from the Secretary of the CPC Provincial Committee and Provincial Governor

利用1996-2009年省级面板数据分析了财政分权下省级官员异质性与碳排放的关系。研究发现:财政分权与碳排放存在正相关关系,分权度的提高不利于碳排放量的减少,这说明财政分权会降低官员对碳排放管制的努力。官员是影响碳排放的重要因素,省级官员职位、来源类别和任期长短的不同对碳排放控制的影响具有差异性。实证结果显示:相对于京官而言,本省晋升的省长不利于碳排放的减少;加入省级官员来源类别与财政分权的交互项后,本省晋升的省委书记和省长对碳减排的净效应都是正的。随着任期的增加省级官员对碳减排的影响呈现倒U型关系。本省晋升的省委书记对碳排放的影响在直辖市和非直辖市,自治区与非自治区之间存在显著差异。

This paper examines whether local officials tend to change the policy of carbon emis- sion on the basis of fiscal decentralization, using provincial-level dynamic panel data from 1996 to 2009. It shows that the increase of fiscal decentralization level doesn＇t help to reduce carbon emission. It finds that local officials may not do their efforts to control carbon emissions for fiscal decentralization. Officials are also important factors affecting carbon emissions, and the impact on carbon emissions from position of provincial officials, source category and length of term is different. Com- pared with officials with posts in the capital, governors promoted from the local is not conducive to reduce carbon emissions. When we joined the interaction of source categories with the fiscal decentralization, the net effect impact on carbon tax from governor and party secretary promoted from the local is positive. With the increase of term, the relationship between provincial-level officials and carbon emission is inverted u-shaped. The impact on carbon emission from party secretary promoted from the local, the autonomous regions and non-autonomous regions, municipalities and non-municipal is different.