高管腐败、传染效应与投资者保护——基于白培中腐败案的实证分析

Executive Corruption, Contagion Effect, and Investor Protection -- Empirical Evidence from the Bai Peizhong Case

本文以受到网络媒体广为关注的由小偷引出、公安部门试图封锁、经网络爆料的白培中腐败案为契机，首次研究了高管腐败的传染效应、影响因素及其传导机制。本研究发现，首先，白培中腐败案不仅使事件公司的股价下跌，而且由于信息传递作用，也对同行业公司产生了传染效应。其次，公司的政府控制性质对传染效应具有杠杆作用，加重了政府控制公司的传染效应。然而，公司如果由国际四大审计则对传染效应具有一定的抵减作用。再次，白培中的撤职对事件公司股价的下跌和传染效应均具有较为明显的抑制作用。最后，公司高管的在职消费等是市场传染效应的信息传导机制，潜在的腐败信号会加重公司的传染效应。此外，进一步分析还发现，传染效应不受同行业公司的盈余质量、财务重述行为的影响。

By studying a recent executive corruption case in China （the Bai Peizhong case）, which was initially exposed by a theft, later blocked by the local security department, and finally spread through the Internet, this paper first examines the contagion effect of executive corruption and its determinants and transmission mechanism. We find that （1） in response to the news, the stock prices of the two listed companies involved declined over the event window and the negative effect spilt over to their peer companies in the same industries; （2） the above contagion effect was more pronounced in the state-owned peers but was attenuated by the employment of an outside Big Four auditor; （3） the stock prices of the two involved companies declined and their peers＇ behaviour was inhibited by the dismissal of Bai Peizhong; （4） the above market reaction was a result of investors＇ expectation of the existence of large non-pecuniary compensation in the involved companies and industries; and （5） the contagion effect was not influenced by earnings management or the financial restatement of the peer firms.