集聚效应对我国地方税收竞争行为的影响——基于行业税负的实证研究

Agglomeration Effects on Local Government Tax Competition in China:An Empirical Study Based on Industrial Tax Burden

差异化的地区经济集聚程度,使我国地方政府间的税收竞争行为存在"逐底竞争"和"逐顶竞争"之分,而产业集聚因素也将对地方税收竞争行为产生重大影响。以我国30个省级行政区2006-2011年面板数据进行实证分析,结果显示,地区间税收竞争行为存在显著差异,而且产业集聚对地方税收竞争态势的影响也不同。因此,中央政府在协调地区间的税收利益时,应区别对待不同性质的经济区,提高经济集聚水平。即利用集聚租实现非匀质地区间自发的税收协调,同时要加强匀质地区间的税收利益协调。

Due to the differences of the degree of regional economic agglomeration, the tax com- petition between China＇s local governments can be divided into ＂race to the bottom＂ and ＂race to the top＂ . The industrial agglomeration would also have a significant impact on the local tax competition. This paper makes an empirical analysis based on the panel data of China＇s 30 provincial administrative regions during 2006-2011. The results show that there exist significant differences in the behaviors of tax competition among the regions, and the industrial agglomeration also has different impacts on the tendence of local tax competition. Theretbre, when coordinating tax benefits among the regions, the central government should treat the economic regions with different natures differently, and improve the level of economic agglomeration, i.e., to realize the spontaneous tax coordination between the non-homogeneous regions by making use of the agglomeration rent, at the same time, the tax bebefit coordination between homogeneous regions should be strengthened.