摘要
按照差分功率消耗分析(DPA)的攻击性质和特征,以核函数机制理论推导系统正常运行中密码芯片功率消耗的概率分布密度值,引入密钥在某情况下获取时功率消耗和攻击分析结构模型间的互通信熵值,基于DPA攻击下,以风险量化密码芯片在模拟攻击下的抗风险能力。通过研究发现,这一个量化机制一方面能够非常高效的把和互通信熵值类似的指标验算出来,另一方面还能够在很大程度上实现密钥芯片风险分析能力的提升。
According to the nature and characteristics of the differential power analysis (DPA) attacks, derive the normal operation of the system password chip power consumption size' probability distribution density values with kernel mechanism theory; introduce key and get power per hour and mutual communication entropy among the attack structural model analysis under certain circumstances. On the basis of DPA attacks, carry out quantitative risk analysis of simulated attacks for password chip. Through the studys, find that this quantitative mechanism can be very efficient to check out the indicators which is similar to mutual communicate entropy on one hand, on the other hand it also enables the chip to enhance the key risk analysis capabilities to a large extent.
出处
《科学技术与工程》
北大核心
2014年第28期70-75,共6页
Science Technology and Engineering
基金
吉林省科技发展计划重点项目(20120301)资助
关键词
DPA
核函数
互通信熵值
风险量化
模拟攻击
DPA
kernel
mutual communicate entropy
quantitative risk
simulated attacks