银行关系、政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——基于我国上市公司的实证分析

Bank Relationship,Political Relevance and the Allocation Efficiency of Credit Resource——Empirical Analysis on Chinese Listed Companies

我们以2003—2013年我国沪深两市2330家上市公司为样本,研究上市公司借助政治关联和银行关系获得融资便利后的经济后果以及是否会有过度投资现象。研究表明,对于所有上市公司,建立政治关联会导致企业的过度投资,而银行关系则不会。在国有企业中,两种关系对上市公司的贷款违约率均没有显著影响;而在民营企业中,政治关联能有效地降低银行贷款的违约率,而银行关系对此无显著影响。

This paper takes 2330 Chinese listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2013 as the sample and studies the economic aftermath after the listed companies get financing facilities by political relevance and bank relationship and whether overinvestment phenomenon exists. Research indicates that for all the listed companies,building political relevance can lead to the overinvestment of enterprises but bank relationship can't. In state- owned enterprises,the two relationships have no significant effects on the loan default rate of listed companies. But in private enterprises,political relevance can effectively lower the default rate of bank loan but bank relationship has no significant effect on it.