与他人共在的源初方式——亨利关于与情的物质现象学研究

Original Intersubjective Community: Michel Henry's Material Phenomenology of Pathos-with

亨利在其生命现象学或物质现象学体系中为他人问题提供了新的现象学描述。与胡塞尔为代表的意识哲学家把"我"与他人关系的本质归于知觉主体间性不同,亨利认为一切可能的共同体所共有的真实本质是生命。一方面,作为根本上异于表象的源初显现方式,生命通过在自身之中绝对内在的、持续不断的动情来显现自身及向自身显现;另一方面,"我"与他人都在生命之中并通过生命而显现其自身,共同体中众成员的自身显现同时也是生命的自身显现。"我"通过绝对内在的自身显现成为个体,他人亦然。最终,"我"与他人因共享同一内在的本质而"与情",与情是一切可设想的共同体的最普遍的形式。

Based on his radical phenomenology of life or material phenomenology, Michel Henry provides a new phenomenological description on the question of intersubjectivity. His thought leads him to a reversal of Husserl＇s perceptive intersubjectivity. Henry suggests the originally pathetic intersubjectivity in which I am with the other as the essence of every possible community. On the one hand, life is the immediate giveness of itself to itself in auto-affection ; on the other hand, the intersubjective community is joined together through the pathos of life. Life can explain both the individuality of the individual and the individual＇s participation in a shared, affective community of the living. Pathos-with is the broadcast form of every possible community.