内部控制信息披露与控股股东掏空——中国版“萨班斯”法案的实施效果

The Disclosure of Internal Control Information and Tunneling of Controlling Shareholders:Consequences of the Chinese " SOX" Act

本文基于控股股东掏空视角,研究了我国内部控制建设的经济后果。研究发现:宏观制度层面,《企业内部控制基本规范》实施后,控股股东掏空显著降低,而《企业内部控制配套指引》的实施并未带来显著变化;微观企业层面,自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的公司,控股股东掏空较低,考虑产权性质调节作用后,自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的民营公司掏空程度更低;然而,内部控制强制披露的效果均不明显。基于信号理论,本文解释了为何我国内部控制自愿披露的效果好于强制披露。本文研究表明我国内部控制建设取得了一定积极成效,但强制披露效果并不明显,仍需加强监管和处罚。

This study investigates the consequences of internal control in China. We find that, in the institutional-level,tunneling decreased with ＂the Basic Standards for Enterprise Internal Control＂. However, the same result cannot befound for ＂the Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control＂. In the firm-level, tunneling decreases with the voluntarydisclosure of internal control assurance report, to some extent, which is more significant for the private listed firms.Nonetheless ,the same conclusion cannot be drawn with the mandatory disclosure of internal control. Consistent withsignaling theory, this study shows the voluntary disclosure of internal control has signaling effects and the development ofinternal control in China makes some achievements, but the consequences of mandatory disclosure are not significant andthe supervision and penalty needs to be enhanced.