荒漠生态补偿利益主体行为的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis on behavior of stakeholders in the desert ecological compensation

建立与完善生态补偿机制是荒漠生态环境保护的重点内容。为了研究荒漠地区生态保护利益相关者的补偿机理,通过建立演化博弈分析的复制动态模型,对各利益相关主体的行为及其相互影响进行研究,分析各策略的动态演变过程,讨论演化结果的稳定性。结果表明:各博弈方策略的演化方向受对方策略初始状态的影响,并与博弈双方支付矩阵的参数有关,但政府及管理部门是更为重要的主导者,他们的行为与意愿直接决定了均衡解;生态补偿在保证农牧民采取稳定的"保护"策略中起着至关重要的作用;合理确定沙区的生态补偿金额、降低沙区的生态保护成本、在监管过程引入奖惩机制和增大监管力度,有助于实现荒漠生态保护的可持续发展。

Establishing and improving ecological compensation mechanism is the very important content for hungriness ecological environment protection. In order to study the compensation mechanism of stakeholders in desertification control, a replication dynamic model in evolutionary game theory is constructed to investigate the potential factors which influence stakeholders＇ behavior, the dynamic process of strategy and stability of the evolution results. It shows that the stakeholders＇ behavior is influenced by the opponent＇s strategy and some parameters in the gaming matrix.But the local government is more dominantly important, whose wishes and behavior directly determine the equilibrium solution. Ecological compensation is an essential means to ensure farmers and herders to gain more profits in the case of protection than without the protection. Finally, suggestions are given that a reasonable ecological compensation, lower cost of ecological protection, reward and punishment mechanism and increased supervision would contribute to realize the sustainable development of desertification control.