期刊文献+

征收补偿政策对家电逆向供应链运营策略与绩效的影响 被引量:5

Effects of the Collection Compensation Policy on the Operation Strategy and Performance of Appliance Reverse Supply Chain
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摘要 针对由制造商和回收商构成的家电逆向供应链系统,基于生产者责任延伸的理念构建征收补偿政策下制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,采用数理方法研究征收补偿政策对废旧产品回收率、制造商利润和回收商利润的影响,并通过数值算例方法分析有关因素对政策实施效果的影响。结果表明:在采取减征环保费的措施下,征收补偿政策实施后资源再利用的效率和逆向供应链成员的效益均比征收补偿政策实施前有所提高,征收补偿政策的实施具有有效性;原材料的单位采购价格和废旧产品的单位回收变动成本等其他因素对提升征收补偿政策的实施效果亦具有重要影响。 For the appliance reverse supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a recycler, the manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model under the collection compensation policy is constructed on the idea of extended producer responsibility. By mathematical methods, the recycling rate of end-of-life product, manufacturer's profit and recycler's profit after the collection compensation policy are studied. And the influences of relevant factors over the effectiveness of policy implementation are analyzed by some numerical examples. The results show that, under the condition of reducing environmental protection fees, the efficiency of resource recycling after the collection compensation policy is higher than that before it, and the benefits of reverse supply chain members after the collection compensation policy are better than those before it, so the implementation of the collection compensation policy has validity ; other factors, such as the price of raw material purchasing and the variable recycling cost of end-of-life product, are important to promote the imple- mentation effectiveness of the collection compensation policy.
作者 柳键 曾剑锋
出处 《广东财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第5期27-39,共13页 Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71261006)
关键词 征收补偿政策 逆向供应链 制造商 回收商 生产者责任延伸 STACKELBERG博弈 collection compensation policy reverse supply chain manufacturer recycler extended producer responsibility Stackelberg game
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