企业高管在职消费、超额在职消费与企业价值——“代理观”与“效率观”的理论协调及其实证检验

Executive Perquisite Consumption,Excess Perquisite Consumption and Firm Value:A Theoretical Coordination of Agent View and Efficiency View and its Empirical Test

为了协调企业高管在职消费＂代理观＂与＂效率观＂二者间的矛盾,将在职消费分解为正常在职消费与超额在职消费,并基于薪酬替代理论构建测度超额在职消费的经验模型,采用2007年-2012年中国上市公司平行面板数据检验正常在职消费和超额在职消费与企业价值的关系。结果显示,超额在职消费在现实中的存在具有客观性,其对企业价值会产生消极影响。这意味着,在职消费中的超额在职消费作为代理成本的一种形式,在涉及高管薪酬激励及其业绩后果的相关问题时应予以充分考虑。

Divarieation between the agent view and the efficiency view on executive perquisite consumption has been an unsolved problem. In order to coordinate the conflict between the two views, this paper theoretically decomposes perquisite consumption into normal and excess perquisite consumption and puts forward two concepts of perquisite consumption. Furthermore, it constructs a model for measuring excess perquisite consumption, and uses the panel data of China＇s listed companies during the period of 2007 -2012 to test the relationship between normal and excess perquisite consumption and firm value. The empirical result confirms the existence of excess perquisite consumption in real enterprises and its negative impact on firm value. This means that as one form of agent costs, excess perquisite consumption should be fully considered when it comes to executive compensation incentives and the issues related to the performance.