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棘轮机制:国际私募资本在中国的治理模式 被引量:1

Ratchet Mechanism:How Foreign Private Equities Implement Complex Financial Contracts in China
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摘要 通过引入战略的制度观视角,考察棘轮机制作为国外私募资本进入中国市场时规范本土创业家的一种公司治理模式。该机制中的向上棘轮对创业家进行所有权激励,向下棘轮则可以对投资者进行保护。面对中国经济转型时期的特殊制度环境,私募资本能够通过棘轮机制克服创业家的机会主义行为和自身的水土不服症,创业家也能够在与私募资本的合作中得到专业指导,从而实现双赢。选取五家在香港上市的大陆企业作为案例进行研究,验证了关于私募资本在进入中国早期与后期运用棘轮机制的三个推论。 How do private equity( included venture capital) investors implement complex financial contracts to monitor and incentivize entrepreneurs in emerging economies? How do entrepreneurs in these economies adopt these sophisticated Western-style governance and inventive practices? Through five in-depth case studies in China from 2002 to 2009,we find that equity ratchet,as a performance-based incentive instrument,can be a tool to tame local entrepreneurs in an environment characterized by institutional voids. Instead of being a 'coach'in professionalizing venture companies in developed economies,private equity investor need play the role of a'tamer'to train entrepreneurs in emerging economies,emphasizing ownership's incentive function as the ex ante mechanism to overcome contractual hazards. Due to the liability of foreignness,in the early stage of private equity's involvement in emerging economies,private equity investors are more likely to set a high performance target,and apply the ratcheting up mechanism to attract local entrepreneurs. In the later stage,however,those investors are more likely to set moderate performance targets to get protection from the ratcheting down mechanism. This article enriches the research of entrepreneurship and private equity by leveraging the institutionalbased framework,introduces the liability of foreignness theory of international business into the private equity literature,and further identifies the different functions of equity ratchets in the different stages of emerging economies.
出处 《吉林大学社会科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第6期63-71,173,共9页 Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition
关键词 棘轮机制 私募资本 创业家 战略的制度观 equity ratchet private equity entrepreneurs strategic view of institution
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