摘要
从不完全契约理论中权力配置资本的视角出发,数理分析了政府和管理层作为企业关键资源的实际掌控者,如何通过关键资源配置影响煤炭企业的扩张饥渴和产能过剩,并通过实例分析验证煤炭资源整合中是否存在国企扩张以及其对整合价值效应的影响,并据此提出在"政府引导、市场运作、科学管理"的原则下适度控制煤炭产业规模。
From the view for the right to allocate capital in the incomplete contract theory, this paper had a mathematical analysis of the government and the manager, who played roles as actual controllers of the critical resources, about the way to affect the hunger of expansion and the excess production capacity in the coal enterprises by property distribution. Meanwhile it also proposed to control the scale of the coal enterprises appropriately in the principle of "government guiding, market operating, scientifically managing".
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第11期35-39,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(12BGL044)
国家社会科学基金重大项目(11&ZD163)
中国博士后基金项目(20110491491)
教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(11YJA790137)
国家大学生创新性实验计划项目(201310290055)
关键词
政府干预
煤炭资源整合
国企扩张
控制权契约
government intervention
coal resource integration
state-owned enterprise expansion
control right contracts