摘要
本文基于九龙坡合作社"二次分红"案例的剖析,在一个扩展的交易成本经济学(TCE)模型内探讨了中国农业产业化经营模式的一般制度特征,并对均衡状态下农业产业化模式的内在不稳定性进行了分析。本文的研究表明,最优农业产业化模式的选择取决于分市场的交易效率,这一模型也揭示了商品契约与要素契约的互补特性,并认为运用跨市场的"补偿"不但可以解决农业产业化模式的内在不稳定性,而且有利于解决产权的谈判力效应与违约诱惑的共生困境。
Based on the exploration of the pioneering work of "Second Dividend" by Jiulongpo Cooperative, this paper uses an expanded TCE model to study the general institutional characteristics of China's agricultural industrialization modes, and their inherent unsteadiness at equilibrium. We draw the conclusion that the choice of the optimal agricultural industrialization modes depends on the relative market efficiency. Our model also reveals the complementary character of the commodity contract to the factor contract, and further concludes that the introduction of the cross-market "Reimbursement" not only contributes to the solution of the inherent unsteadiness, but also helps us out of such symbiosis dilemma as "the more negotiation rights, the more inducement to break the contract".
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期141-152,共12页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
国家社科基金重大项目"加快推进对外经济发展方式转变研究"(批准号:10ZD&017)的支持