基于委托代理理论的BT模式激励问题研究

Incentives of BT Model Based on Principal-agent Theory

BT模式逐步成为政府解决非经营性基础设施建设资金紧缺的一种新的尝试,但在项目建设过程中,政府和投资人之间不可避免地会出现"逆向选择"与"道德风险"问题。在BT项目中引入激励机制,通过建立政府给予投资人的最优激励报酬模型,分析影响最优激励系数变化的各种因素,并以此为基础提出激励报酬模型在以BT模式建设工程项目过程中应用的建议,有助于解决政府和投资人之间的委托代理问题并实现政府与投资人之间利益最大化的均衡。

A new attempt that the government solves the funding shortage of non-business infrastructure construction by BT model has been gradually popular. In the process of construction,the ＂adverse selection＂ and ＂moral hazard＂ problem between government and investors will appear inevitable. The incentive mechanism given to investors will be introduced in BT project through the establishment of the government＇s optimal incentive compensation model to analyze the various factors affecting the optimal incentive coefficient change,and proposed some suggestions in the course of construction in BT project according to the incentive compensation model. This is helpful to solve the principal-agent problem between the government and investors and make the balance of interests between the government and the investors.