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论投票选举作为控制乡村代理人的一种方式 被引量:16

Election as a Way of the State's Controlling Agents of Rural Grass-Roots
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摘要 国家通过党的领导、行政命令和指挥,以及财政转移支付来控制和支配村委会,村委会本质上是国家在农村基层的代理人。投票选举可视为国家挑选和控制农村基层代理人的一种方式,这一方式由于可以将乡村社区信任网络纳入国家行政控制体系、部分实现对村干部问责、减少基层干部之间专用性投资和裙带关系,因而能显著降低国家治理乡村的成本。村委会选举制度的效果目前因村级集体经济和上级政府对农村专项资金的控制而大打折扣,因此需要将村集体产权落实到个人,在乡镇一级成立村民议事会等改革措施来进一步完善和加强。 The state controls and governs the village committee by leadership of the Communist Party,administrative order and command, and transfer payment from exchequer. The village committee is essentially the state ' s agent in rural areas. Electing village committee members by voting should be regarded as a way of the state's selecting and controlling agents of rural grass-roots. The election can bring the rural community trust networks into the state's administrative control system, partly keep the grass-roots cadres accountable, and reduce the specific investment and nepotism among the grass-roots cadres, so it remarkably lowers the state's cost of rural governance. The effect of election is greatly weakened currently during to the collective village economy and superior governments ' control of rural special fund.Privatizing collective village assets and setting up villagers council in the township government is a necessary step to perfect and strengthen the system of electing the village committee.
作者 谭秋成
出处 《中国农村观察》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第6期71-81,96,共11页 China Rural Survey
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参考文献11

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二级参考文献37

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