论蒯因的逻辑哲学

On Quine's Philosophy of Logic

在蒯因的自然化认识论的背景中,本文对他的逻辑哲学做了批判性的系统考察,讨论了如下三个问题:蒯因关于逻辑和逻辑真理究竟说了些什么?在蒯因的逻辑哲学中存在哪些难题、困境和悖论?蒯因关于逻辑或逻辑真理本来应该再说些什么?最后阐述了对逻辑的实在论和认识论的证成:逻辑与我们生活于其中的世界,与我们关于这个世界的认知,以及与我们的语言和思维实践相关联。逻辑理论中包含着关于世界、认知、语言和思维的描述性内容。描述对于被描述者而言可真可假,所以逻辑理论也有可能出错。逻辑之所以是可修正的,其根本原因即在于此。

This paper critically and systematically examines Quine's philosophy of logic in the background of his naturalized epistemology. Section 1 expounds what Quine has said about logic or logical truth, summarized as his 11 theses about logic; Section 2 investigates what troubles there are in what Quine has said about logic, involving Katz's revisability paradox, the paradox of bad translation and revisability, the paradox of deviance and revisability, and the paradox of revising logic by using logic, and how we resolve the troubles in order to make his philosophy of logic coherent;Section 3 conceives what Quine should say further about logic, for example, why logic is revisable? Does logic have connection with the world, with our cognition of the world, and with our language? If yes, how? How do we revise logic? Or, how do we construct a new logic? Why is it so difficult for most people, even for some eminent philosophers, to accept the logic-revisable thesis? And so on.