零售商主导型供应链渠道管理与悖论机制分析

Channel Management and Analysis of Paradox in A Retailer-led Supply Chain

普遍认为零售企业压榨供应商、但实际上供应商利润率远高于零售商是业界关注的一个热点商业悖论问题。通过构建无退货、一般退货、全额退货、线性回扣等体现零售商不同强势地位的供应链渠道管理模型,研究并比较了退货和回扣等强势契约机制以及销售努力对零售供应链管理绩效的影响。分析表明供应商通过批发价定价可以有效转移强势契约带来的风险和成本支付,零售商不能通过强势契约显著提升零售供应链效益。零售商应该利用渠道优势首先强化对批发价定价权的影响,在此基础上合理采用强势契约机制。本文研究很好地解释了零供双方渠道地位与利润水平矛盾的商业悖论问题。

There is a hot paradox problem in business , i.e., the dominated retailers are considered to use power-ful contracts such as returns and rebates squeeze suppliers , but in fact that suppliers have much higher profit margins than retailers .We establish and compare four increasingly stronger power retailer-led supply chain deci-sion models：non-returns, common-returns, full-returns, full-returns and linear rebate without sale effort , full-returns and linear rebate with sale effort .We show that returns and rebates cannot bring more revenues for domi-nated retailer when supplier can determine the wholesale price of goods , and the dominated retailer should strengthen the impact on even control the wholesale pricing with channel power first .This paper explains the cau-ses and effects of the business paradox between retailers and suppliers .