期刊文献+

关键词拍卖中基于广义第一价格的投标价格决策分析 被引量:3

Decision Analysis of Bidding Prices base on Generalized First Price in Keyword Auction
原文传递
导出
摘要 在关键词拍卖中,由于广告商不能保证对关键词的估价是最优投标价格,因此如何选取最优的关键词投标价格一直是广告商急于解决的问题。基于与Friedman投标模型假设条件等价的关键词拍卖投标假设条件,计算了各个关键词广告位置的胜标概率,并在广义第一价格拍卖机制下建立了关键词投标价格决策模型。该模型可以使广告商选取最优的关键词投标价格。最后通过仿真验证了该模型的有效性。 Since advertisers cannot correctly evaluate the optimal bidding prices in keyword auction, the optimal bidding price decision has been a key problem waiting to be solved. Based on some assumptions equivalent to the assumption in Friedman's bidding model, the winning probabilities of keyword bidding are computed for all different advertising positions. According to the generalized first price auction mechanism, the decision model of optimal keyword bidding price is established. The model can support advertisers to select the optimal keyword bidding prices. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by simulations.
作者 原全 汪定伟
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第10期66-71,共6页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70931001) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(61273203) 国家教育部博士点基金资助(200801450008)
关键词 关键词拍卖 最优投标价格 胜标概率 广义第一价格拍卖机制 keyword auction optimal bidding price winning probability of bidding generalized first price
  • 相关文献

参考文献17

  • 1Friedman L. A competitive bidding strategy[J]. Opera- tions Research,1956, 4(1):104-112.
  • 2Milgrom P R, Weber R J. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding [J], Econometriea, 1982, 50 ( 5 ) 1089-1122.
  • 3刘树林,汪寿阳,黎建强.投标与拍卖的几个数学模型[J].管理科学学报,1998,1(2):11-16. 被引量:39
  • 4Fain D C, Pedersen, J. O. Sponsored Search: A Brief History[C] //Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Conferenceon Electronic Commerce, Ann Arbor, MI,June 11- 12, 2006.
  • 5欧海鹰,吕廷杰.在线关键词广告研究综述:新的研究方向[J].管理评论,2011,23(4):54-63. 被引量:13
  • 6Varian H R. Position auctions[J] International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007(6), 25: 1163-1178.
  • 7Edelman B, Ostrovsky M. Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions [J]. Decision Support Sys- tems, 2007, 143(1): 192-198.
  • 8Edelman B, Ostrovsky M, Schwarz M. Internet adver- tising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keyword[J]. The American Economic Review, 2007,97 ( 1 ) : 242- 259.
  • 9Bu Tianming, Deng Xiaotie, Qi Qi. Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction[J]. Information Processing Letters, 2008,105(2) : 41-46.
  • 10张娥,汪应洛.关键字广告位拍卖的收益等价性研究[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(3):92-96. 被引量:22

二级参考文献93

共引文献94

同被引文献24

  • 1张娥,郑斐峰,汪应洛.网络广告竞价中的在线拍卖及其竞争策略[J].系统工程,2005,23(6):115-118. 被引量:10
  • 2Fain D C,Pedersen J O.Sponsored Search:A Brief History[C]//In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,Ann Arbor,M I,2006.
  • 3Edelman B,Ostrovsky M,Schwarz M.Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction,Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords[J],American Economic Review,2007,97(1):242–259.
  • 4Kempe D,Mahdian M.A Cascade model for externalities in sponsored search[C],Internet and Network Economics,LNCS,2008,(5385):585-596.
  • 5Varian H R.Position Auctions.International Journal of Industrial Organization[C],2008,25(6):1163-1178.
  • 6Aggarwal G,Goel A,Motwani R.Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords,Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce[C],2006,(EC-06):1-7.
  • 7Gonen R,Vassilvitskii S.Sponsored seach auctions with reserve prices:going beyond separability[C],Internet and Network Economics:LNCS,2008,(5385):597-608.
  • 8Edelman B,Ostrovsky M.Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions[J].Decision Support Systems,2007,143(1):192-198.
  • 9Bu T M,Deng X T,Qi Qi.Forward looking Nash equillibruim for keyword auction,Information Processing Letters[C],2008(c),2(105):41-46.
  • 10Iyengar G,Kumar A.Characterizing optimal keyword auctions[C],Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Sponsored auctions,Ann Arbor,2006.

引证文献3

二级引证文献5

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部