摘要
Recently, global financial crisis or meltdown rocked the international financial market. This havoc was the result of the reckless use of financial derivatives that received spontaneous patronization from the financial whiz, but it is strange to discover that those proponents of market economy embarked on policy that was purely Keynesian in principle. The episode started in August 2007 with the collapse of subprime mortgage market and reached its climax during August 2008. Central banks in many countries of the western world intervened in the market to pump additional fund to give buoyancy in the credit market. The crisis encapsulated with the queer idea of financial instruments and multiple origins related to subprime mortgage left its trail in both developed and developing countries. Thus, an elaborate analysis of the causal link among various innovative instruments highlighting a mismatch between academic doctrine and real-life perspective and the inadequacy of the institutional arrangements supposed to tame the volatility of the market may be a useful guide to financial analysts and policy planners. The purpose of this paper is to highlight systemic gaps in the meltdown and redefine the contour of macroeconomics most appropriate to weather such catastrophe in the future.
