财政分权、地方财政赤字与土地财政

Fiscal Decentralization,Local Deficit Financing and Land Finance——Based on China's Provincial Panel Data of 1998-2010

本文基于地方财政赤字的视角,研究了财政分权与地方政府土地财政策略的内在作用逻辑。理论分析表明:中国式财政分权所造成的地方财政赤字扩大化,激励了地方政府在利益觉醒后利用预算制度缺口,用"扭曲之手"来攫取预算外财政收益,进而驱动地方政府通过积极的土地财政手段来实现财政增收的政策目标。省际面板数据的实证结果进一步验证了财政分权、地方财政赤字对土地财政的正向驱动作用。

From the perspective of local deficit financing, this paper explores the internal logic working between fiscal decentralization and local government＇s land finance. Theoretical analysis shows that local deficit expansion caused by fiscal decentralization in China has become an incentive for local governments to grab off-budgetary financial revenue, which impels them to take an active land finance strategy to increase local fiscal revenue. The empirical test supported by provincial panel data also proves that the fiscal decentralization and local deficit financing both have obvious positive driving effects on the land finance.