高管变更机制效率与机构投资者治理角色——基于内生性视角的实证新发现

The Efficiency of Top Management Turnover Mechanism and the Governance Role of Institutional Investors——A New Empirical Finding from the perspective of Endogeneity

以2008、2009年两市A股发生了高管变更事件上市公司的数据为研究样本,基于内生性视角实证检验了机构投资者持股与上市公司高管变更机制效率之间的相互作用。在普通最小二乘法(OLS)证实了两者之间存在内生性关系的基础上,进一步的二阶段最小二乘法(TSLS)研究表明:(1)机构投资者持股行为显著影响了高管变更机制效率,但高管变更机制效率对于机构择股决策并没有显著影响;(2)机构投资者对于高管变更机制效率的改善只体现在提升公司的市场绩效方面,对于改善公司的财务绩效没有显著的积极作用;(3)只有压力抑制型的机构投资者能够显著影响高管变更机制效率。

From the perspective of the problem of endogeneity, this paper empirically tested the interaction between the efficiency of top management turnover mechanism and institutional investors＇ governance behavior, with the datum of Chinese A-share listed companies of 2008 and 2009 whose top management have changed. The OLS confirmed that the interrelationship between the institutional investors＇ behavior and the top management turnover mechanism is statistically significant. The further TSLS established the conclusions of this paper： Firstly, the institutional investors＇ behavior significantly influences the efficiency of top management turnover mechanism, but the inverse relationship is not approved. Secondly, the governance behavior of institutional investors only improves the market performance of listed companies. The positive effect of institutional investors on the amelioration of financial performance is not proved significant. Thirdly, only the pressure-resistant institutional investors are confirmed to have influence on the efficiency of top management turnover mechanism.