费奇“纳米意向性”理论评析

Comments on Tecumseh Fitch's Nano-intentionality Theory

美国生物哲学家特库姆塞·费奇挑战了心灵哲学家丹尼尔·丹尼特所坚持的衍生意向性的一元论主张。他站在非适应主义的立场上创造性建构了"纳米意向性"理论,以此解释无法还原为物理作用的下行因果关系的真核细胞层次上的组织作用,尝试从功能和发展的阶段来描述心智的进化轨迹,即"纳米意向性-复合意向性-微观意向性-序列意识"。尽管费奇的纳米意向性对克服进化认识论适应主义路向的弊端进行了有益尝试,但仍存在概念和方法上的局限。

American philosopher of biology --Tecumseh Fitch challenged Daniel Dennett who insisted on monism claims about derived intentionality. From a perspective of non - adaptionism, he originally proposes this term, nano - intentionality, in order to give an account of eukaryotic organizational mechanism which cannot reduce to downward causation under the foroe of physics. He attempts to describe the evolutionary trajectory of the mind from the stage of function and development, namely, nano - intentionality, composite intentionality, micro - intenfionality and serial awareness, etc. Although Fitch＇ s nano - intentionality theory has made a positive effect on overcoming the drawbacks of traditionally adaptionism paradigm of evolutionary epistemology, conceptual and methodological limitations still need to be clarified.