大规模侵权债权与担保债权清偿顺序之反思

Introspection on Mass Tort Claims and Discharge Order of Secured Claims

大规模侵权债权难获救济的根源在于股东有限责任制所造成的侵权风险的外部化。多数论者所持的被动债权人优先于担保物权人清偿的方案属风险的外部分配模式,其对担保物权设限乃至劣后清偿虽有一定合理性,但存在对担保信用体系冲击过大的风险。较为妥当的解决思路是通过产品责任、董事经理责任等责任保险制度设计将风险作内置化处理。破产清偿顺序本质上系属公共政策分析范畴,系统思维、利益衡量思维有助于解决方案的优化。

The origin that the victims in mass tort claims are hard to be relieved lies in the externality caused by shareholders ＇ limited liability. The probably reasonable argumentation, which may be classified as external distribution model, is that the passive creditors should be prior to the secured creditors while in liquidity, whereas there stil exists certain risks because it leads to too much impacts on the credit guarantee system. The appropriate solution seems to interiorize the risks through designing such liability insurances as product liability, liability of director etc. Bankruptcy discharge order essentially belongs to the category of public policy analysis, thinking of systematology and interests equilibrium are helpful to optimize the above solutions.