我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度研究

Study on Executive Compensation in Chinese Monopoly Industries

本文以2003-2010年的相关数据为样本构建面板数据,对垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度展开实证研究。结果发现,垄断因素夸大了高管努力在企业绩效中的贡献,削弱了薪酬绩效的敏感度;管理层权力会引致高管人员对垄断租金薪酬的追逐。进一步研究还发现,垄断行业企业高管权力越大,其通过盈余操纵业绩获取绩效薪酬的金额越高,越倾向于通过盈余管理、增加业绩权重和规模权重来谋求权力薪酬的增长。上述研究结论显示,简单地将高管薪酬与企业绩效挂钩的契约,会受到绩效"噪音"的影响,弱化薪酬激励高管努力的效应。这将为我国进一步完善高管薪酬契约提供新的经验证据。

In recent years, the executive compensation has always been a hot and controversial topic, especially the imbalance of the executive compensation between monopoly and non-monopoly industries, which calls the ration- ality and legitimacy of the executive compensation in monopoly industries into question. Many empirical studies show that the managerial power leads to ＂excessive compensation＂ of executives. Executives will raise the value of stock options by the manipulation of accounting earnings or other serious accounting irregularities （Efendi, Srivastava ＆ Swanson,2007 ）. In order to avoid the risk resulted from performance fluctuation, executives prefer that the compen- sation is unrelated to the performance. Low cost of directors favoring executives leads to that the management power has a significant impact on executive compensation（ Lu Rui,2008 ）. It shows that the executive compensation incen- tive can not necessarily solve the principal-agent problem. When being lack of management supervision and balances of power, the company＇s incentive and restraint mechanisms will fail. Especially in monopoly industries where the law of average rate of profit can＇t work, enterprise performance which is the foundation for assessment is not all re- suited from executive＇s effort. Executive compensation is bound to have some ＂luck＂ there （Bertrand＆Mullainathan, 2001 ）. However,previous research does not eliminate monopoly profits from the nominal performance which make it impossible to determine the real contribution of executive and measure the monopoly rent payment. How much of the enterprise performance comes from executives＇ efforts and how much from the monopoly pro- tection？ How can we determine whether the compensation system matches the corporate performance？ Is there a managerial power in the process of establishing executive compensation in monopoly industries？ The thesis tries to answer these questions. In order to answer these questions, this paper puts forward three hypotheses as follows. First of all, executives＇ power compensation and the managerial power have positive correlation in monopoly industries. At the same time, pursuing of the monetary compensation does not weaken that of the power compensation. Second, under the influence of the managerial power, the greater power executives have, the more they incline to manipulate earnings by earnings management, so as to obtain higher performance compensation. Finally, executives raise their compensation by in- creasing the weight of performance or weight of scale. To test our hypothesis, we select 5193 observations from 2003 to 2010 of 1120 companies on Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange as research samples. By these samples we research the influences the three aspects of mo- nopoly advantage, managerial power and business performance have on executive compensation and further explore whether pursuing of implicit compensation may lead executives to pursue the increase of the power compensation through earnings management. First ,the thesis tries to measure the monopoly rents compensation, and analyzes the foundation it bases on and how it is related to managerial power. Second, using modified Jones Model to decompose the accounting performance into the non maneuvering performance and maneuvering performance, this paper checks whether the executives in monopoly industries control performance through earnings management. Finally, this paper analyzes whether executives raise their compensation by increasing the weight of performance or weight of scale if the executives compensation level is restrained. The results of the paper show： monopoly increases the contributions of executive＇s efforts in corporate perform- ance and weakens the sensitivity of compensation and performance. Executives chase the monopoly rents compensa- tion by the managerial power. Executives in monopoly industries prefer power compensation and increase it through the managerial power, while executives in non-monopoly industries prefer dominant salary. Moreover, the study shows that linking compensation and performance simply will be affected by performance ＂noise＂, which will bring about the weakening of compensation incentive mechanism. During the enterprise reform in China, how to encourage the managers to work hard is a very difficult problem. The contribution of this paper is to expand the understanding of executive compensation incentive mechanism and provide a new empirical evidence for us to improve the compen- sation contracts.