制造商持股供应商情形下的组装供应链协调

Coordination of assembly supply chain when manufacturer holds equity in suppliers

针对由多个互补性零部件供应商和单个制造商构成的组装供应链,研究了制造商持股供应商情形下,组装供应链的协调问题.首先,给出了批发价格契约下各节点企业的最优策略,分析发现:若制造商的股权投资可实现各零部件生产成本的降低,制造商的最优订货量随其对任一供应商的持股比例增加而增加,但小于集中化决策情形下的最优订货量.然后,引入回购策略,设计了协调契约,并指出供应商通过该协调契约可实现各节点企业期望利润的帕累托改进.

Based on an assembly supply chain consisting of multiple complementary component suppliers and a single manufacturer,we study the coordination of assembly supply chain when manufacturer holds equity in suppliers.Firstly,we derive the optimal strategy of each enterprise under the wholesale-price contract,and find that manufacturer’s optimal order quantity increases as equity held in any supplier increases if manufacturer’s equity holding investments can lead to components’ cost reduction.However,the optimal order quantity of manufacturer under the wholesale-price contract is less than that of centralized system.Then,we develop the coordination contract by introducing the buy-back policy,and show suppliers can use this coordination contract to achieve Pareto-improvement.