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计算机网络对抗行动策略的Markov博弈模型 被引量:8

A Markov game model of computer network operation
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摘要 在分析计算机网络对抗问题特点基础上,将博弈论与马尔可夫决策相结合,以折扣总回报值为目标函数,提出计算机网络对抗行动的马尔可夫博弈新模型.运用凸分析理论证明得到网络对抗新模型存在均衡策略,并将攻防双方的均衡策略转换为一个非线性规划问题进行求解.通过算例分析,验证了方法的可行性和有效性. On the basis of analyzing the characteristics of computer network operation(CNO),a new CNO model is established after combining game model with the Markov decision processes,and whose objective function is the summary of discounted reward.Then,the existence of equilibrium strategy of the new model is proved by convex analysis,and the equilibrium strategy is got by solving the corresponding nonlinear programming problem.In the end,the calculation and sensitive analysis of the example demonstrate the proposed method is feasible and effective.
出处 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2014年第9期2402-2410,共9页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金 国家自然科学基金重点研究计划项目(71031007) 国家自然科学基金(71401175)
关键词 网络对抗 马尔可夫决策过程 凸分析 非线性规划 network operation Markov decision process convex analysis nonlinear programming
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参考文献15

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二级参考文献68

共引文献301

同被引文献56

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