中国通货膨胀预期陷阱研究

A Study on Inflation Expectation Traps in China

通胀预期陷阱的生成机理是货币当局与微观主体之间的相互博弈。本文运用理论模型对承诺解、欺骗解、均衡解、陷阱解依次进行了演绎推论,通过经典函数找到了通胀预期陷阱区。本文实证研究发现,我国近年来共有三个连续型与间断型的通胀预期陷阱区域,这说明我国公众的通胀预期在短期是学习型适应性预期,在长期属无偏性、有效性的非完全理性预期。公众通胀预期非稳定性和周期性波动是一种常态,但基本上处于可控状态。中国货币政策时间非一致性问题存在但并非显著,超常经济增长冲动、政绩导向和投资增长是通胀预期陷阱的宏微观主导诱因。

Inflation expectation trap is a social economic phenomenon that is not cognitive, its formation mechanism is the result of the mutual game between the monetary authority and the individuals. This paper confirms the argument above by solving the commitment solution, deception solution, equilibrium solution and trap solution of the central bank＇s objective function. Empirical analysis shows that there are three inflation expectations trap periods. The public inflation expectations demonstrate learning and adaptive features in short term, but unbiased, effective and less than perfectly rational features in long term. Instability and periodicity of the public inflation expectations is a normal phenomenon but under the control of central bank. The time inconsistency problem of monetary policy exits insignificantly in China. The impulse of extraordinary economic growth from performance-oriented government, as well as the investment growth is likely to be the leading causes of inflation expectation traps.