企业创新投资与高管薪酬业绩敏感性

Corporate Innovation Investment and Executive Pay-for-performance Sensitivity

创新投资项目周期长、不确定性大、难以评估等特点导致公司高管与股东之间的代理问题更加严重。本文结合中国特定的制度环境,考察公司薪酬契约在事前激励公司高管从事创新投资以及事后约束公司高管侵占创新投资资源的作用机制。实证结果表明:首先,事前的高水平薪酬可以促进公司高管从事创新投资。其次,高管薪酬业绩敏感性被用来约束高管在创新投资事后的机会主义行为,这很可能是由于新会计准则实施研发支出有条件资本化会计确认所带来的溢出效应。进一步考察发现高管薪酬业绩敏感性对创新的影响与其他治理机制之间具有替代效应。本文关于代理冲突影响创新投资与薪酬业绩敏感性之间关系的结论具有理论与现实意义。

Using a new hand- collected sample of listed firms with R&D spending and a matching sample without R&D spending in the period 2007- 2011,we find that executives' compensation is higher for the companies with greater R&D intensity. We also find that higher R&D intensity generally tends to increase pay- for- performance sensitivity. Additional tests show that the innovation motivating effects of executive compensation contract will vary with other governance mechanism or agency conflicts.