产权性质与股权激励设计动机——上海家化案例分析

Stock Incentive Design between SOEs and Private Firms——Case Study on Shanghai Jahwa

鉴于大样本实证研究中产权性质差异对股权激励制度影响的内生性问题,我们选择了经历国有和民营产权性质转变的上海家化为案例,分析其国有和民营阶段股权激励制度设计动机的差异,研究企业性质对股权激励制度设计动机的影响。本文通过比较上海家化由国有控股转为民营上市公司过程中五套股权激励方案的设计,发现了产权性质差异影响股权激励设计动机的证据。国有企业由于激励比例及激励收益受到过多的政策限制,导致激励不足,并且由于内部人控制等问题,股权激励设计倾向于福利型。相反,民营控股公司股权激励方案设计更加合理,倾向于激励型。研究结果表明,未来研究上市公司股权激励问题不应忽略产权性质的差异。监管当局应该减少对于国有企业股权激励设计的行政干预,推进国有企业薪酬机制的市场化进程。

In this case study,we compare stock incentive design of Shanghai Jahwa before and after privatization to gauge differing motivations driven by differing property rights. We find that in the state- owned phases,the extent of incentives is so confined. Plus the lack of supervision for managers,incentives plans tilts too much to managers' welfare. In contrast,plans of private phases are more reasonable and function better. These results imply that ownership differences merit further attention when doing research on the stock incentives domain. Moreover,the regulatory authorities should relax the intervention for stock incentives issues in state- owned firms and accelerate the marketalization of compensation systems.