券商背景风险投资与公司IPO抑价——基于信息不对称的视角

Venture Capital of Underwriters and IPO Underpricing——Based on Information Asymmetry Theory

券商背景风险投资兼具承销商和风险投资双重身份,在中国资本市场上备受关注。已有研究表明承销商和风险投资机构在公司IPO过程中都能起到认证效应,表现为更低的IPO抑价率;另一方面,风险投资的高回报率会弱化券商背景风险投资的认证效应,导致更大的利益冲突,表现为更高的IPO抑价率。本文研究发现,整体而言中国风险投资持股的上市公司并不具备显著较低的IPO抑价率,如果将风险投资机构划分为普通风险投资机构和券商背景风险投资机构,则仅有券商背景风险投资持股的上市公司IPO抑价率显著较低,表明在中国券商背景风险投资对其所持股的公司具备认证效应,而非利益冲突。进一步研究发现,券商背景风险投资机构持股的公司在IPO之后股票收益率波动率较低,表明其风险不对称程度较低;相对于普通风险投资机构,券商背景风险投资机构的投资特征并无明显差异;声誉良好的券商背景风险投资机构的认证效应更加明显。

Venture capital of underwriters owns two aspects of venture capital and underwriter, and attracts more attention in China＇s capital market. Existing literature show that both underwriter and venture capital can play a certification role in firms＇ IPO process, which leads to low IPO underpficing. However, high return from venture capital may mitigate underwriter＇s certification effect, which induces to greater conflict of interests and higher IPO underpricing. The empirical results from this paper indicate that certification effect exits in China＇s market. Compared to firms backed by other type venture capital and firms without venture capital investment, the firms backed by venture capital of underwriters have lower under-pricing ratio, which adjusted by market and industry. Further study proves that, the stand deviation of stock return of firms backed up by venture capital of underwriters after IPO is lower, demonstrates less serious information asymmetry. What＇s more, we can not find significant difference of investment characteristics between venture capital of underwriters and other venture capital, which indicate that the certification effect is not originated from investment, just from the role of combination of venture capital and underwriter.