委托代理视角下国企公司治理的改进

The Agent Theory and Improvement of the State- owned Corporation's Governance

委托代理理论的分析表明,"全民"股东的委托人资质不完全和委托代理链条的过长是我国国企公司治理问题的症结所在。但是,由于社会主义国家的国有股必须存在且我国当前国有股减持的空间越来越小,有效改进我国国企公司治理需要从缩短国企委托代理链条的角度着手。人民代表股东会制度和社会化董事制度据此而设计,前者立足于直接缩短国企产权安排下委托人与代理人之间的距离,后者着眼于实现委托人与代理人身份的合一。

According to the agent theory, the inadequate qualification of the whole peoplesharoholder client and the excessive long agency chain is the sticking point of the state owned corporation＇s governance in our country. To shorten theagency chain is the key to solve our state owned corporation＇ s governance problems because socialism state owned shareis to be existed forever and its decreasing space is very small, The systems of people＇ s deputy shareholder committee andsocialized director should be designed to shorten the agency chain, and the former is to shorten the agency chain directly,and the latter is to realize the identity between the client and the agent.