欧盟信用评级机构的市场监管研究——一条通向欧洲的信用评级之路

Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in Europe

信用评级机构被认为是金融危机的始作俑者之一。无论美国还是欧洲,都通过了许多法律以期更密切对其予以监督。无可争议的是,这些规定并不足以根本上解决金融危机所产生的问题。本文介绍了欧盟最新关于信用评级的规则,其中包括两次强制性评级,为评级机构、合同条款和民事责任制度设置了一个时间限制。为了有效地实施上述措施,两个附加性手段需要引进:其一,实行一个强制性的欧洲信用评级可以打破信用评级市场中的寡头垄断局面;其二,帮助可以快速成长的欧洲小型信用评级机构。如果责任制度确实具有威慑力,民事赔偿责任制度只能是作为导入自律机制的一个促进措施:这确保了错误的信用评级(如雷曼兄弟案)将被要求以强制性的损害赔偿,而这一新的规则也需要引入举证责任倒置的制度。这包括要求信用评级机构适时地调整评级,以避免对信用发行主体过早的信用下移,下调"评级展望"。

Credit rating agencies are said to be among those who caused the financial crisis. Boththe United States and Europe have passed numerous laws intended to monitor them more closely. It standsundisputed,however,that these regulations do not suffice to solve the problems that evolved in the financialcrisis. This article evaluates the European Commission’s latest Credit Rating Agencies Regulation,whichintroduces,among others,two mandatory rating,sets a time limit to the contractual relationship between RatingAgency and the contracting entity and a civil liability regime. In order to effectively enforce the affected rights,two additional means need to be introduced： Mandating a European rating could break the market’s oligopolisticstructure and help jump-start small European agencies. A civil liability regime can only serve as an incentiveto introducing self-control if liability rules are truly deterring：To ensure that wrong ratings（such as LehmanBrothers’） will actually lead to enforceable damage claims,the new Regulation needs to introduce a reversalof the burden of proof. This includes requiring the agency to immediately adjust a rating,avoiding an issuer’spremature downscaling and introducing a “rating outlook”.