期刊文献+

并购失败原因研究——基于终极控股股东利益攫取的视角 被引量:8

Causes for M&A Failures: from the Prospect of Interest Grabbing of the Ultimate Controlling Owners
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摘要 本文构造了理论模型用于探究上市公司开展的兼并收购是否由终极控股股东利益攫取动机所引发,并运用2007-2011年并购样本进行实证检验。研究发现:第一,在现金流权与控制权私人收益共同决定最终控制人收益的背景下,终极控股股东对上市公司现金流权与控制权分离度越大,上市公司在非关联并购中支付的并购溢价越高,而在关联并购中情形相反。第二,终极控制人对上市公司现金流权与控制权分离度越大,并购的累计超额收益越低且并购后经营绩效越差。此外,本文为揭示并购失败的管理层代理假说、自傲假说以及市场择时假说提供了进一步的经验证据。 We construct a theoretical model to investigate how ultimate controlling owners use takeovers to extract private benefi ts at the expense of minority shareholders and further exam whether the separation of ownership and control results in value-destroying mergers and acquisitions between 2007 and 2011 empirically. We fi nd that: fi rst, the merger premium is higher for fi rms with greater separation of ownership and control in unconnected MAs while is lower for fi rms with greater separation of ownership and control in connected MAs. Second, greater separation of ownership and control will result in lower value creation(lower CAR and lower change in operation performance). Besides, we provide additional empirical evidence to managerial agency, hubris and market timing hypotheses which interpret what drives value-destroying mergers and acquisitions.
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第11期21-28,共8页 Securities Market Herald
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(NO.2014YJS062)
关键词 并购 现金流权与控制权分离 并购绩效 M&A separation of ownership and control M&A performance
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参考文献27

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